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Abstract
This paper presents empirical evidence and a theoretical foundation in
favor of the view that the retirement age decision affects older workers’ em-
ployment prior to retirement. To the extent that there are search frictions
on the labor market, the return on jobs is determined by their expected dur-
ation: the time to retirement is then key to understanding older workers’
employment. Countries with a retirement age of 60 are indeed characterized
by lower employment rates for workers aged 55-59. Based on the French
Labor Force Survey, we show that the likelihood of employment is signific-
antly affected by the distance to retirement, in addition to age and other
relevant variables. We then extend McCall’s (1970) job search model by
explicitly integrating life-cycle features with the retirement decision. Using
simulations, we show that the distance effect in interaction with the gener-
osity of unemployment benefits and the depressed demand for older workers
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explains the low rate of employment just before the eligibility age for the
Social Security pension. Finally, we show that implementing actuarially-fair
schemes not only extends the retirement age, but also encourages a more
intensive job-search by older unemployed workers.
Keywords: Job Search, Older Workers, Retirement
JEL Codes: J22, J26, H55
1 Introduction
Ageing jeopardizes the sustainability of Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) systems. Faced
with this changing demographic trend, most developed countries have chosen to
encourage the elderly to delay retirement by rewarding a longer working life with
more actuarially-fair pensions. However, especially in some European countries,
such a strategy could be weakened by the fact that a significant proportion of
older workers are actually unemployed or entitled to specific assistance programs
long before the current age at which benefits are first available. One often alleged
reason is that technical progress makes older workers less employable1. Hence,
trying to increase older workers’ rate of employment seems to be an unattainable
goal in a context where jobs available for them are scarce.
1 It is, however, a debated issue (Crépon et al. (2002), Hellerstein et al. (1999), Friedberg
(2003), Aubert et al. (2006)). Technological and organisational innovations may be beneficial
to older workers because they are more skilled and experienced. On the other hand, innovation
accelerates skill obsolescence and requires adaptability. Whereas Borghans & TerWeel (2002)
and Friedberg (2003) find no significant impact of technical changes on old workers’ employ-
ment, Aubert et al. (2006) observe such an influence and emphasize both organizational and
technological changes.
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In this paper, we put forward the idea that the existence of a retirement
date intrinsically creates a decrease in the employment rate just before this age.
To the extent that there are search frictions on the labor market, the return on
jobs is determined by their expected duration: the time to retirement is then
key to understanding older workers’ employment. The observed low employment
rate of near-to-retirement people then cannot be considered as a reason for not
postponing the retirement age. The reasoning is completely reversed: retirement
postponement is actually likely to increase the employment rate of these workers,
thereby contradicting the widespread view that the low employment rate of older
workers makes any extension of the retirement age pointless.
We indeed observe in countries with a retirement age of around 60 (Belgium,
France, Italy), that the employment rates for 55 - 59 year-old workers are the
lowest in the OECD countries (Figure 1)2. In contrast, Japan, and to a lesser ex-
tent Sweden, the US, Great Britain and Canada are characterized by the highest
retirement ages and employment rates between the ages of 55-59. This suggests
that the retirement age could affect the employment rate of older workers prior to
this age: the later the retirement age, the higher the employment of older work-
ers before 60. However, the existence of unemployment and disability programs
for older workers in the first group of countries could disqualify this idea. These
programs are often considered as an early retirement device before the official
eligibility age for the Social Security (SS) pension (Gruber &Wise, 1999; Blondal
& Scarpetta, 1998). They indeed correspond to an inactivity spell until retire-
ment occurs. From our point of view, this situation must be distinguished from
2Figure 1 plots the scattered male employment rate of older workers aged 55 - 59 relative
to the overall employment rate of those aged 25 - 59 against the retirement age, calculated for
the country panel selected by Gruber & Wise (1999) in 1995.
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Figure 1: Older Worker Employment Rate and Retirement Age (Men, OECD,
1995)
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retirement stricto sensu3 and viewed as a (non-)search decision of non-employed
workers. Of course, the high generosity of these programs could amplify the re-
tirement age feedback effect by giving unemployed people the means to wait for
retirement without searching for a job. This is why a low retirement age asso-
ciated with generous unemployment benefits could explain the low employment
rate of older workers that prevails in some European countries such as Belgium,
France or Italy.
However, we agree that this interpretation must be considered with caution
at this stage. In this paper, using individual data, we try to properly identify the
effect of the distance to retirement on the labor market equilibrium before the
early retirement age. We take advantage of the French Social Security system
and its reform in 1993 to propose an original identification strategy based on
the existing heterogeneity across individuals in terms of distance to retirement.
3 In the rest of the paper, the term "retirement" will be used with this strict meaning.
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Moreover, we also take advantage of the fact that the retirement age is quite
independent of the current labor market status to cope with a potential reverse
causation from unemployment to retirement. We then estimate a logit model on
individual panel data (French Labor Force Survey, hereafter LFS) that measures
how the distance to full pension age affects male employment probabilities. It
appears that the shorter the distance to retirement, the lower the probability of
being employed.
In order to rationalize the distance effect revealed on French individual data,
we develop a modified version of McCall’s (1970) model, in which unemployed
workers look for a new job and choose an optimal search intensity, which will
influence the average length of unemployment spells. Beyond the heterogeneity
arising from the exogenous wage offer distribution, life cycle features are also
considered. Following Ljungqvist & Sargent (2008), agents age stochastically. In
addition, retirement choice is endogenous. Our originality is to investigate how
the retirement decision, mainly driven by the tax on continued activity imposed
by Social Security provisions, modifies the search behavior. The relative value
of retirement compared to employment determines the job value for unemployed
older workers.
Our streamlined model must be considered as a first attempt to model the
interaction between retirement decisions and employment issues at the end of
working life. In particular, it is clearly beyond the scope of the paper to explain
the overall retirement age distribution. Especially, unlike Benitez Silva (2003),
we leave aside the interaction between job search, health and wealth.4 Moreover,
4See Bettendorf & Broer (2003) for another search model with savings. However, with perfect
insurance, they impose strong restrictions on search decisions.
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it must be emphasized that this is only one way to interpret our empirical results.
We are not able to say whether this distance effect affects labor demand or
labor supply. The estimated variable is the equilibrium employment probability.
However, as the retirement age and the unemployment search intensity are joint
decisions for workers, we think that focusing on labor supply is a natural first
step in the analysis of the interaction between retirement and pre-retirement
labor market decisions5. This is not to say that labor demand does not play
any role in the decrease in the employment rate at the end of working life. We
do take into account this dimension, but exogenously, by calibrating by age the
wage distribution and the separation rate.
Our main contribution is then to quantify the importance of the distance
effect in the observed decrease in the employment rate prior to the retirement
age by calibrating the model on French data and simulating some counterfactual
experiments. It appears that the distance effect plays a key role in conjunction
with the generosity of unemployment benefits for older workers. We also show
that the distance effect modifies pre-retired workers’ search particularly when
5Chéron et al. (2006) show in the Mortensen-Pissarides general equilibrium framework that
firms’ firings and hirings are respectively higher and lower when the retirement age is getting
closer. However, when the retirement age is endogenous, this interaction between workers’
retirement choice and firms’ hiring and firing decisions is not a simple extension of the distance
argument, but a substantially different one. Indeed, in that case, the retirement age is private
and asymmetric information. Firms must solve a potentially difficult problem to infer the
expected retirement age for each individual, especially when the SS system is actuarially fair,
i.e. when retirement age relies on individual preferences for leisure. The issue of the hiring,
firing and bargaining decisions would then be much more complex in this context. Modelling
the labor demand side when the retirement age is endogenous is an interesting issue, but it is
left for future research.
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the separation rate is high. Time to retirement matters, but in conjunction with
other factors such as higher unemployment benefits and depressed labor demand.
We then illustrate the policy implication of this result by studying the impact
of a Social Security reform that removes the tax on continued activity, thereby
rewarding a longer working life with an actuarially-fair increase in pension. We
show that such a policy does yield a double dividend: (i) workers are encouraged
to delay retirement, which is the usual expected gain from this measure (ii) more
unemployed older individuals are now willing to look for a job and accept job
offers.
The distance effect has already been explicitly identified by Seater (1977)
who theoretically stresses, in a life-cycle labor supply model, that the job search
is age-dependent. Adopting a descriptive approach, Hutchens (1988) shows that
hired older workers are less equally distributed across industries and occupation
than both recently hired younger workers and all older workers. He interprets
this empirical finding as suggestive of the fact that older workers are offered a
smaller set of alternative job opportunities than younger workers because the
latter have more years to devote to a job than the former. More recently, also
using a labor supply approach, Ljungqvist & Sargent (2008) quantitatively show
that the elasticity of job search intensity to unemployment benefits is greater
for older workers, leading to the view that the impact of labor market institu-
tions can be age-dependent. However, they only briefly mention the distance
to retirement effect, and even less do they aim at quantifying its contribution
to the low employment rate of older workers. While they refer to "changes in
economic turbulence", modelled as immediate loss of human capital at times of
involuntary job displacements, we focus in our paper on the combination of the
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distance effect and generous pre-retirement plans. Although the distance effect
has already been mentioned in other papers, ours is the first contribution that
aims at quantifying it and deriving its implications for SS reforms by making
both retirement and search decisions endogenous.
Our paper is organized as follows. We first investigate the empirical relevance
of our intuition (Section 2). We then present our theoretical framework in order
to propose an interpretation and a quantification of the distance to retirement
effect and finally an evaluation of a policy that introduces more actuarially-fair
pension adjustments (Section 3).
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present some empirical evidence in favor of the view that
there is a feedback effect of the distance to retirement on the employment rate
of older workers. It is not the biological age (its absolute level) that matters
in explaining the employment rate of older workers, but what can be called the
social age (the age relative to the retirement age). More precisely, we measure
the feedback effect of the retirement age on the chances of being employed using
individual data. Our intuition is that, as individuals get closer to their pension
age, they are less likely to be employed. The use of individual data enables us
to control for other determinants of older workers’ employment.
2.1 Data and Empirical Strategy
The distance to retirement is captured by the difference between the current age
and the expected retirement age. The first problem is that the latter is unob-
servable. The second one is the risk of misinterpreting a reverse causation from
unemployment to retirement, as the status on the labor market could affect re-
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tirement choices. Considering the French pension system allows us to cope with
both problems. The retirement age is completely determined by the required
number of contributive years to get the full pension rate, because of the huge
tax on continued activity that prevailed in the French pension system prior to
the 2003 reform: as stressed by Blanchet & Pelé (1997), in France, there are no
incentives to delay retirement after the full pension age as no pension adjust-
ments are made for any additional working year6. The retirement can then be
approximated by the full pension age which is exogenous to their labor market
status. Obviously, our proxy for the retirement age does not take into account
incomplete careers. However, we believe that our proxy remains relevant as
unemployment episodes in the French system are included in the number of con-
tributive periods. Furthermore, non-continuous careers due to maternity leaves
and family commitments could indeed make our proxy less accurate. To avoid
this bias, we measure the impact of the retirement age on male employment only.
The retirement age is then computed by adding to the age at first job the
required number of contributive years to qualify for full pension. The distance
to retirement (Di) for an individual i is equal to his age at first job (Fi) plus the
legal number of contributive years to get the full pension (C) minus his current
age (Ai): Di = Fi + C − Ai. However, if a person enters the job market at
a very young age, he cannot retire before the eligibility age for SS pension (60
years old) even though he has accumulated the required number of contributive
quarters before this age. In this case, the expected retirement age is then set at
60. Finally, we take into account the fact that individuals aged 65 receive the
6This is why the expression "full pension" is used. Note that continued activity is highly
rewarded before the full pension age.
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full pension whatever their number of contributive years7. Finally, our distance
to retirement is defined as: Di = Min[Max(60, Fi + C), 65] − Ai. So, we have
two subsets of individuals in our sample: individuals who are not constrained by
the 60 or 65 bounds and those who are constrained, whose expected retirement
age is either 60 or 65.
Tables A.1 - A.4 in the Appendix display the descriptive statistics of our
sample. We consider variables that are widely used as key determinants of em-
ployment probabilities: age, age squared, education, marital status, number of
children, size of city, sector, citizenship, education and occupational group. We
add to these standard characteristics the number of years left before retirement.
In the descriptive statistics, to summarize the impact of expected retirement on
employment probabilities, distance to retirement is presented in dummies (11
years and more, 6 to 10 years, 3 to 5 years and less than 2 years). Table A.1
displays the expected number of years before retirement as a function of age for
individuals of age 50 and older. Obviously, most individuals aged 58 and 59
(aged 55-57) have to wait for less than two years (between 3 and 5 years) before
retiring. These statistics are consistent with the fact that the vast majority of
French workers retire at the age of 60 (see Blanchard & Pelé, 1997). However,
Table A.1 displays some heterogeneity in the distance to retirement at any age.
The first lines of Table A.2 suggest that the number of years before retirement
affect employment probabilities: employment odds fall as the individual gets
closer to retirement. 63% of individuals who have to wait less than 3 - 5 years
before drawing full pension are still working, while this proportion goes down to
7Note that we consider individuals who entered the labor market before 30 years old, so that
we can consider that they get the full pension rate in their 65th year due to specific adjustments
after this age.
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37% for those who are 2 years away from retirement.
Where does this heterogeneity in the distance to retirement come from? First,
as people start working at different ages, the retirement age is a heterogeneous
individual characteristic. Provided we control for the level of education (and
other individual characteristics), we believe that the heterogeneity in the age
at first job explains the employment probability at the end of the working cycle
through a distance to retirement effect. Secondly, the Balladur SS reform in 1993
provides another source of heterogeneity. The required number of contributive
quarters before retirement amounts to 150 quarters for individuals born in 1933
or earlier, while the 1934 generation needs to contribute 151 quarters to Social
Security, the 1935 generation 152 quarters and so on, and individuals born in
1943 or later, 160 quarters. As the required number of contributive quarters
has gradually increased, considering data in the post reform era allows us to
include in our sample individuals with heterogeneous distances to retirement.
More precisely, we consider workers who are identical in all respects but for
their number of contributive years depending on their year of birth. For an
individual i born in year j, the distance to retirement is actually defined by:
Di,j =Min[Max(60, Fi +Cj), 65]−Ai.
Does this double source of heterogeneity in the distance to retirement sig-
nificantly help explain the employment probability at the individual level? We
first check whether this raw information has some explanatory power (Strategy
I, Section 2.2). As one might be skeptical about the identification of the dis-
tance to retirement effect in this first stage, we then propose to show that the
informational content specific to the distance to retirement does indeed matter
for understanding the employment status at the end of the working life (Strategy
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II, Section 2.3). Finally, using difference-in-difference estimation, we will focus
more specifically on the exogenous source of distance to retirement provided by
the 1993 reform (Strategy III, Section 2.4).
Whatever the strategy implemented, we estimate logit models that measure
how the distance to retirement age affects the chances of being employed. Es-
timating an unemployment duration model could be judged more appropriate.
However, focusing only on unemployed people is too restrictive as non-employed
older people are mainly outside the labor force, entitled to specific income pro-
grams. The dependent variable is the male probability of employment. It is
coded as 1 when working, 0 otherwise, meaning unemployed or inactive (but not
yet retired). The estimate is based on 13 successive waves of the French Labor
Force Survey (LFS) (from 1990 through 2002). A third of the LFS sample is
replaced each year. As a consequence, the LFS follows the same individual for
only 3 consecutive years. Our sample is an unbalanced panel, which allows us to
check the robustness of our results against events that are specific to each year,
such as macroeconomic fluctuations. We implement random effect logit models
that take advantage of the multi-period nature of the data and control for unob-
served individual heterogeneity. Error terms then consist of random individual
specific effects and unobserved individual characteristics that vary with time. A
Hausman test confirms that a random effect logit is preferable to a fixed effect
model.
2.2 Preliminary Investigation (Strategy I)
We first measure the effect of conventional explanatory variables (age, educa-
tion, sector, etc.) on male employment probability before adding the distance
to retirement in the estimated equation. The estimated coefficients of the model
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including only traditional variables without distance are displayed in the first
column of Tables A.5 and A.6 the Appendix. The reference individual is a French
blue-collar worker, with a low educational attainment, employed in the manu-
facturing sector, living with his spouse in the Paris area. He has no children.
As far as standard characteristics are concerned, the estimates yield significant
and expected results: higher skills (captured by the occupational group) and
living in the Paris area increase employment probabilities. A high educational
attainment, activities in the service sector and French citizenship also improve
employment odds. Family characteristics affect employment status: compared
with the reference individual, not having a spouse (respectively having 6 chil-
dren or more) tends to reduce employment odds by 57% 8 (respectively by 35%).
Notice that the coefficients on age are positive and negative on the quadratic
term, thereby capturing the positive effect of age (as a proxy for experience) and
the negative impact of human capital depreciation with age (quadratic term) on
employment odds.
We add to the standard explanatory variables specific dummies on age (from
the age of 50 to 59). age = k means that the dummy equals 1 if the individual is k
years old, 0 otherwise. These variables capture the eligibility to programs specific
to old workers, allowing them to withdraw from the labor force before the age of
60. From the age of 50 to 59, dummy variables appear negative and significant,
which could be interpreted as the effect of the declining human capital and of
older workers’ specific programs.
Table 1 shows estimation results when the distance to retirement is intro-
duced in the regression as an additional explanatory variable. Estimates on
standard control variables are barely affected by the introduction of distance
8
1− e−0.8404
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Table 1: Strategy I: Distance to retirement effect
Coefficient P value
Distance × (Age = 50) -0.018 0.474
Distance × (Age = 51) -0.028 0.278
Distance × (Age = 52) 0.020 0.446
Distance × (Age = 53) -0.009 0.747
Distance × (Age = 54) 0.009 0.755
Distance × (Age = 55) 0.035 0.224
Distance × (Age = 56) 0.082 0.003
Distance × (Age = 57) 0.125 0.000
Distance × (Age = 58) 0.186 0.000
Distance × (Age = 59) 0.192 0.000
to retirement (second column of Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix), which
allows us to be confident that there is not much of a multicollinearity problem.
We introduce distance to retirement in a non linear way. Two elements prompt
us to adopt a non linear specification. First, for individuals who are far away
from retirement, an additional year away from the retirement age is unlikely to
influence their employment status. Another source of nonlinearity could arise
from the existence of specific programs for workers over 50 years old. We then
define the variable dist×(age = k) as the distance to retirement (in years) for an
individual of age k, with k = {50, 51, ..., 59}, 0 otherwise. Distance to retirement
could affect employment odds differently at each age k. This will be shown by
the difference in the coefficients of the interaction terms.
First, notice in Table 1 that the distance to retirement appears significant
with the correct sign: this confirms the view that older individuals’ employment
rate is affected by their expected retirement age. However, this is true only
after the age of 56. This age appears as the threshold age at which distance
to retirement begins to matter. It is interesting to note that, at these ages,
generous income schemes are available to older workers9, thereby suggesting a
9Conditional on having already contributed the required number of quarters to Social Se-
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strong interaction between generous income plans and the expected retirement
effect. Interestingly, age variables (age, age squared and age dummies from 50 to
59) remain significant, suggesting that distance to retirement negatively affects
employment odds beyond the specific effect of age.
Secondly, the coefficient value on the distance variable increases from 0.082
at age 56 to 0.192 at age 59. As shown in Table A.1, at 55 (59), the hetero-
geneity in the distance to retirement ranges from 5 (1) to 10 (5) years. The
noticeable increase in the coefficient associated with the distance and age inter-
action variable indicates that the distance effect is particularly significant when
individuals are sufficiently close to retirement 10. For instance, for a worker aged
59, if the distance to the retirement age is increased by one year, this raises the
employment odds by 21.1% - but only by 8.5% for a worker aged 56.
As one might argue that the age at first job actually captures the individual’s
education, thereby introducing a bias to our estimates. It is important to note
that we control for educational attainment with a dummy variable. Individuals
are either in the Low Education group (no degree to degrees obtained below the
completion of High School, before Baccalauréat) or the High Education group
(Baccalauréat and beyond). Table A.5 in the Appendix shows that this variable
is significant and correctly signed in all our estimates. However, as the education
variable cannot capture all the heterogeneity in the age at first job, the next
section tries to identify the effect specific to the distance to retirement.
curity, workers aged 55 are also eligible for specific older worker programs.
10We checked that this conclusion remains relevant when the sample is reduced to individuals
of age 50 and more.
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2.3 Experience or distance to retirement? (Strategy II)
By computation, the distance to retirement hinges upon the age at first job. The
heterogeneity in the length of education in itself might actually account for the
employment probability without recourse to the distance to retirement. Even
though there are several ways of interpreting the role of the age at first job on
the employment probability at the end of the working cycle (one could simply
refer to unobserved heterogeneity), the most likely explanation is certainly the
distance to entry or work experience (Benallah et al., 2008): for a given age,
the lower the age at first job, the longer the experience, the lower the desire to
be still at work (as if the disutility of working increased with the length of the
working life). The positive influence of the distance to retirement could actually
come from the negative influence of experience (or the positive one of age at
entry).
Here, we aim to isolate the informational content of experience and then
identify the component specific to the distance to retirement. We take advant-
age of the French Social Security system which implies that experience and dis-
tance to retirement are not necessarily linked for individuals who are constrained
by the 60 or 65 bounds. Indeed, on each constrained sub-population (the "60"
and the "65"), at a given age, experience does not convey any information on
the distance to retirement: for instance, 59-year-old people with more than 40
years of experience are all one year away from retirement, whatever their level
of experience. On each sub-sample, there is no heterogeneity in the distance to
retirement at any age. We can then identify the informational content of experi-
ence when distance to retirement does not matter. The distance variable is then
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omitted from the regression on each sub-sample11. Experience is introduced in
conjunction with age: we can then measure, at each age between 50 and 59, the
specific impact of experience on employment odds. Table 2 shows estimation
results on individuals constrained by the 60 (column (i)) and 65 bounds (column
(ii)). In both regressions, it appears that experience is never significantly neg-
ative as it should be to explain the positive effect of the distance variable in the
first regression (Table 1).
We can go further by considering both distance and experience in the same
regression over the whole sample (column (iii), Table 2). Again, these variables
are introduced in conjunction with age. The influence of the distance effect
purged from the informational content of experience is still positive, and even
higher than in Table 1. For a worker aged 59 (aged 56), if the distance to the
retirement age is increased by one year, this raises the employment odds by 31%
(by 10%). Distance to retirement is even significant at 55 at a 10% level. These
results suggest that a distance effect is indeed at work when the retirement age
is imminent.
2.4 The impact of the 1993 SS reform (Strategy III)
Another way to give more credibility to the influence of distance to retirement
is to exploit the exogenous variation created in the number of contributing years
by the 1993 reform12. Individuals with the same experience can have a different
distance to retirement before and after the 1993 reform. The gradual implement-
11We use the same set of control variables as in the first regression (age, age squared, educa-
tion, citizenship, etc.). Estimates on these variables are displayed in Tables A.7 and A.8 in the
Appendix.
12We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this empirical exercise.
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Table 2: Strategy II : Experience and distance to retirement
Estimation (i)
Constrained population
Minimum age 60
Estimation (ii)
Constrained population
Maximum age 65
Estimation (iii)
All individuals
Coeff. P value Coeff. P value Coeff. P value
Experience × (Age= 50) -0.0493 0.005 0.0191 0.902 -0.0276 0.063
Experience × (Age= 51) -0.0457 0.008 0.0432 0.767 -0.0289 0.057
Experience × (Age= 52) -0.0324 0.058 -0.4808 0.044 -0.0101 0.497
Experience × (Age= 53) -0.0072 0.659 -0.2546 0.322 0.0065 0.651
Experience × (Age= 54) 0.0053 0.745 -0.0127 0.959 0.0186 0.193
Experience × (Age= 55) 0.0161 0.307 -0.2182 0.352 0.0167 0.238
Experience × (Age= 56) -0.0081 0.586 -0.2678 0.217 0.0069 0.605
Experience × (Age= 57) 0.0213 0.125 -0.1752 0.413 0.0395 0.002
Experience × (Age= 58) 0.0003 0.982 -0.3391 0.150 0.0203 0.104
Experience × (Age= 59) 0.0169 0.240 -0.3411 0.120 0.0318 0.014
Distance × (Age = 50) -0.0809 0.053
Distance × (Age = 51) -0.0938 0.028
Distance × (Age = 52) -0.0033 0.938
Distance × (Age = 53) 0.0037 0.932
Distance × (Age = 54) 0.0491 0.250
Distance × (Age = 55) 0.0720 0.098
Distance × (Age = 56) 0.0956 0.020
Distance × (Age = 57) 0.2183 0.000
Distance × (Age = 58) 0.2329 0.000
Distance × (Age = 59) 0.2698 0.000
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ation of the reform implies that the additional contributing year depends on the
cohort. In addition, there are individuals in our sample who are not affected by
the reform. This offers a double variation that gives the opportunity to identify
the effect of the increase in the distance to retirement due to the reform by using
difference-in-difference estimation13.
For instance, people who are 59 and have already experienced 38 years in
the labor market, face different distances to retirement, depending on their birth
date. Individuals born after 1939 are at more than one year to retirement (2
years at most for the 1943 generation), but just at one year for the previous
generations. The workers aged 59 with 38 years’ experience can then be con-
sidered as the treatment group and the 1939 generation (or equivalently the 1998
year) as the treatment date. As the reform is being implemented gradually, the
treatment date is not the same, depending on the experience level considered.
The treatment date is the 1935 generation for people aged 59 with 37 years of
experience, and the 1934 generation for individuals aged 59 with less than 37
years of experience14.
On the other hand, at each age, for different experience levels, some indi-
viduals are not affected by the reform. These individuals are constrained by the
bounds of 60 and 65: individuals of 59 years old with a labor market experience
of 39 years and more are all one year away from retirement; individuals of 59
years old with a labor market experience of 31 years and less are all 6 years
away from retirement. At age 59, whatever the cohort, these individuals are not
13This strategy has been already used by Bozio (2007) to evaluates ex-post the 1993 Social
Security reform.
14Note that the calendar in the LFS implies the consideration of yearly levels of experience
(and not quarterly as in Bozio, 2007).
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affected by the reform. They constitute the control group, which is not defined
for each experience level because we want to use as much variance as possible
in the additional distance to retirement introduced by the reform. In a nutshell,
we have two control groups that we could use jointly or separately: those con-
strained by the 60 bound and those constrained by the 65 bound. We noticed
that individuals constrained by the 65 bound have characteristics in terms of
education and occupation closer to the treatment group. We will then favor this
control group, even though its sample size is more limited.
We can then estimate the impact of the increase in the distance to retirement
by using a difference-in-difference strategy. We focus here on individuals aged
59 with different levels of worker’s experience E (33 years < E < 38 years). We
define a dummy "Expe" which is equal to 1 if the individual is in the treatment
group, i.e. to have E years of experience, and 0 if he is in the control group, i.e.
to have less than 32 years of experience. For a given experience E, the treatment
date corresponds to a particular cohort D. We then define a dummy "D" which
is equal to 1 for individuals belonging to the cohort D and to younger ones and 0
for older cohorts. We then consider the interaction variable "Expe×D" in order
to capture the impact of the exogenous increase in the distance to retirement due
to the 2003 reform. In all estimates, we use the same set of explanatory variables
as in the previous regressions in order to control for differences in observables
between the control and treatment groups.
The results (not shown here) suggest that the reform has a positive influence
on the probability of being employed, but not at a significant level. This result
can be explained by the fact that all treated cohorts are not affected to the
same extent by the gradual reform. Rather than a 0/1 binary variable for the
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treatment date, we finally consider a continuous variable "N" that takes the
value of 0 for the cohorts younger than D and the value of N , the number of
additional contributive years specific to the D cohort and older cohorts. We
then consider the interaction variable "Expe×N" which is equal to the number
N of additional contributive years for the individuals affected by the reform
(individuals of E experience years and of a cohort ≥ D) and 0 otherwise.
Table 3 confirms the positive influence of the distance to retirement on the
probability of being employed. Individuals who bear an exogenous increase in
their distance to retirement have a higher probability of being employed at 59
years old. More precisely, whatever the experience level, the higher the number
of additional contributing quarters (exogenously) introduced by the 1993 reform,
the higher the probability of being employed. For an individual aged 59 with
38 years of work experience, an additional contributive year raises the employ-
ment probability by 35%. The distance variable is significant with the expected
positive sign for E = 36 and 35 (Table 3). However, it is not significant at the
10% level for individuals with years of experience 38, 37, 34 and 33, even if the
p-values are low, at 12%, 13% and 11% respectively, for E = 38, E = 34 and
E = 33. The results are then fragile, even if they go in the right direction.
The sample size is limited (around 165 individuals in the control and treatment
groups). This constitutes a problem for the validity of our empirical strategy. In
addition, if we repeat the same empirical exercise at ages 57 and 58, the inter-
action variable "Expe ×N" appears with the expected positive sign but is not
significant. Again, at these ages, the sample sizes remain small.
Finally, all these convergent results suggest that the distance effect matters
in the understanding of older workers’ employment. The effect appears strongly
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Table 3: Strategy III: Impact of the 1993 reform on the probability of being
employed at 59
N Expe Expe×N
Number of
observations
E = 38 Coeff. -0.5607 -1.6051 1.7365 173
P value 0.7060 0.0030 0.1230
E = 37 Coeff. -0.0079 -2.6595 0.7347 167
P value 0.9920 0.0010 0.2360
E = 36 Coeff. -0.9375 -1.8795 0.9582 175
P value 0.0800 0.0170 0.0470
E = 35 Coeff. -0.9706 -2.1505 1.0664 161
P value 0.0780 0.0080 0.0380
E = 34 Coeff. -0.5666 -1.5578 0.7446 157
P value 0.3080 0.0540 0.1380
E = 33 Coeff. -8.4129 -1.7228 1.2562 86
P value 0.0000 0.1840 0.1170
nonlinear: employment odds are affected only when the distance is sufficiently
close to the retirement age and only for workers between 55 and 59 years old,
who are eligible for specific income programs.
3 The theoretical approach
The job search model appears as a natural candidate for a global approach to
older workers’ employment, provided life cycle features are taken into account.
It must be considered as a first step to improving our understanding of the
interaction between retirement and the employment rate of older workers. We
choose to present a simple model in order to make the key mechanisms more
transparent (Section 3.1). After a careful calibration (Section 3.2), we investigate
and illustrate the mechanisms underlying the distance to retirement effect and
its consequences on employment for older workers (Section 3.3). Finally, we
evaluate the effect of introducing more actuarially-fair pension adjustments on
the employment before and after the early retirement age (Section 3.5).
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3.1 A job search model
The model is a modified version of McCall’s (1970) model, in which unemployed
workers look for a job and choose a search intensity which will influence the
average length of unemployment spells. Beyond the heterogeneity arising from
the wage offer distribution, life cycle features are also considered. Following here
Castañeda et al. (2003) and Ljungqvist & Sargent (2008), agents age stochastic-
ally. In addition, retirement choice is endogenous. Upon death, households are
replaced by other households so that the population is constant over time. Fi-
nally, we discard saving decisions in order to keep the model tractable. In each
period, consumption equals income.
3.1.1 Population dynamics
We first define the exogenous stochastic variables of the model, namely the house-
holds’ age and their employment opportunities. These two stochastic processes
are independent. A worker observes his new age at the beginning of each period
before deciding to accept a new wage offer, quit a job or choose a search intensity.
In each period, some households are born and some die. We assume that the
measure of the newly-born is constant over time. They are born as unemployed
workers. Early retirement is endogenous.
We assume that the population can be divided into 6 age groups15, denoted
Ci for i = 1, ..., 6. These age groups are a stylized representation of the following
life-cycle: if a worker enters the labor market at 20, his expected time in the labor
market is 40 years, and his expected time as a retiree is 20 years. In order to take
into account typical age-specific unemployment rates, we consider the following
age groups. 20 - 34 year old individuals, in C1, start working. Experienced
15More motivations are given in the calibration section (section 3.2.2).
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individuals of age 35 - 49, in C2, expect to be employed for a long time. People
of age 50 - 54 in C3 and especially 55 - 59 in C4, expect that the duration of the
job is short before retirement. Individuals in age group 60 - 64, in C5, can choose
to retire early or not. Finally, people aged 65 and more, in C6, are all retirees as
65 is the mandatory retirement age. In our policy experiments, we will then be
able to measure individuals’ willingness to delay retirement following changes in
pension schemes.
Each individual is born young. The probability for a worker of remaining in
Ci (for i = 1, .., 6) the next period is pii. Conversely, the probability of aging
equals 1 − pii. In each period, a fraction 1 − pi6 of new workers is born. They
replace an equal number of dead workers, so that the measure of the population
is constant. The matrix Π governing the age Markov-process is given by:
t+ 1
t
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
C1 pi1 1− pi1 0 0 0 0
C2 0 pi2 1− pi2 0 0 0
C3 0 0 pi3 1− pi3 0 0
C4 0 0 0 pi4 1− pi4 0
C5 0 0 0 0 pi5 1− pi5
C6 1− pi6 0 0 0 0 pi6
3.1.2 Employment opportunities
Retirement age is endogenous and, in particular, depends on the SS pension p.
After the early retirement age, individuals can choose to get retired conditionally
to their current position on the labor market. An individual still in the labor
force is either employed or unemployed. An unemployed worker receives an
unemployment benefit b and chooses a job search intensity s ≥ 0. The private
incentive to increase the job search intensity is linked to the probability of getting
a job offer in the next period. This probability φ(s) is an increasing function
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of s, and we assume that φ(s) ∈ [0, 1], for s ∈ [0,∞[. This offer is drawn from
an age-specific wage offer distribution Fi(w), which denotes the probability of
receiving a wage offer between the lower wage of the distribution wi and wi,t
(Fi(w) = Prob(wi,t ≤ w)). An unemployed worker observes his new age at
the beginning of a period before choosing a job search intensity and deciding
to accept or reject a new wage offer. Because the wage offer is age-specific, we
consistently assume that the search effort of unemployed workers of age i (si) is
devoted to find a job specific to the age i, i.e. the search process is segmented
by age. Because ageing is a sequential process, unemployed workers visit each
segment of the labor market only sequentially.
Let w¯i,t denote the reservation wage above which the worker of age i accepts
the wage offer wi,t: if wi,t > w¯i,t, he earns that wage in period t and thereafter
for each period he is still at work. The age-specific probability of being laid off
at the beginning of the period is λi ∈ [0, 1]. Calibrating the exogenous variables
Fi(w) and λi by age can capture the potential bias against the demand for older
workers, while keeping the model tractable16.
3.1.3 Labor market stocks and flows
Let Ut,i, Nt,i, Rt,i and Pt,i denote at the beginning of period t the number of
unemployed workers, the number of employed workers, the number of retirees,
and the total population of age i respectively. Let us define Iei (I
u
i ) the indicator
function which is equal to 0 if the employed (unemployed) worker of age i prefers
retirement and 1 if he is still in the labor force. Unemployment rates at each age
16The sole issue of the interaction between retirement, labor market equilibrium and techno-
logical and organizational changes would deserve major theoretical work and is left for future
research.
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then obey the following laws of motion:
Ut,1 = (1− pi6)Pt−1,6 + pi1λ1Nt−1,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
newly unemployed workers
+pi1[φ(s1)F1(w1) + (1− φ(s1))]Ut−1,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
surviving unemployed workers
(1)
and, for i = 2, 3, 4, 5
Ut,i = (1− pii−1)[φ(si)Fi(wi) + (1− φ(si))]I
u
i Ut−1,i−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
unemployed workers coming from age i− 1
+ (1− pii−1)λiI
u
i Nt−1,i−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
unvoluntary quits from age i− 1
+ (1− pii−1)(1− λi)Gi−1(wi)I
u
i Nt−1,i−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
voluntary quits from age i− 1
+ piiλiI
u
i Nt−1,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
newly unemployed workers
+pii[φ(si)Fi(wi) + (1− φ(si))]Ut−1,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
surviving unemployed workers
(2)
where Gi(w) denotes the fraction of age i employed workers at wage w or
less. The age-specific wage offers and separation rates imply that the trans-
ition between age i− 1 and age i leads to voluntary quits if wages accepted at
age i− 1 are lower than the reservation wage at age i. For unemployed workers
of age i who survive in the same age group, the age i-specific search effort si
determines the probability of getting a job offer φ(si). Consistently with the
age-directed search assumption, when the unemployed workers are coming from
age i− 1, their probability of getting a job offer does not depend on the search
effort made at the initial age (si−1). These unemployed workers are assumed17 to
have instantaneously access to the contact probability of the unemployed worker
aged i, namely φ(si).
17When unemployed workers age from i − 1 to i between time t − 1 and time t, their age-
specific search at time t − 1 should imply a probability of getting a job offer equal to zero
at the time of the age transition. It would lead to a temporal (at time t) exclusion of the
matching process. This can be viewed as an excessively restrictive implication of our age-
specific search assumption. Assuming that the ageing worker has instantaneously access to
the contact probability of the worker aged i allows us both to deal with this problem and to
preserve the idea that search is a sequential process over the life cycle.
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The mass of retired workers evolves as:
R5,t = pi5[R5,t−1 + λ5(1− I
u
5 )N5,t−1]
+(1− pi4)[λ4 + (1− λ4)G4(w5)](1− I
u
5 )N4,t−1
+(1− pi4)[φ(s5)F5(w5) + 1− φ(s5)](1− I
u
5 )U4,t−1} (3)
R56,t = pi6R
5
6,t−1 + (1− pi5)R5,t−1 (4)
R66,t = pi6R
6
6,t−1 + (1− pi5)(P5,t−1 −R5,t−1) (5)
where R5 and R
5
6 denote respectively the number of retirees of age 5 and 6 who
have decided to retire at age 5, and R66 the newly retired workers at age 6.
3.1.4 Wage distribution
The dynamics of the wage distribution Gi,t(w) is given by:
N1,tG1,t(w) = pi1
[
(1− λ1)N1,t−1G1,t−1(w)
+φ(s1)max{0, F1(w)− F1(w1)}U1,t−1
]
(6)
and for i = 2, 3, 4, 5
Ni,tGi,t(w) = pii
[
(1− λi)Ni,t−1Gi,t−1(w)
+φ(si)max{0, Fi(w)− Fi(wi)}Ui,t−1
]
+(1− pii−1)φ(si)max{0, Fi(w)− Fi(wi)}I
u
i Ui−1,t−1
+(1− pii−1)(1− λi−1)(1−Gi−1(wi))I
e
iNi−1,t−1 (7)
3.1.5 Preferences
We assume that individuals derive utility from consumption and leisure. Leisure
refers to the time not spent on labor or job search. Intertemporal preferences
are given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(yt, T − zt) where zt ≡ I
uAst + I
e(1−A)h
where function u satisfies the usual Inada conditions, E0 is the expectation op-
erator conditional at time 0, β ∈ [0, 1] the subjective discount factor and yt the
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after-tax income from employment, unemployment compensation or pension. T
is the total time endowment. If A = 0, then the worker is at work and has a con-
stant disutility of labor denoted by h, whereas if A = 1 the worker is unemployed
and has an endogenous disutility of job search.
3.1.6 Government policies
The government provides both a pension p and an unemployment benefit b. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that pensions and non-employment incomes are
not linked to individuals’earning histories. In the benchmark case, we assume
that the pension is not increased by additional years of working beyond the
early retirement age; whatever the retirement age, the pension level is the same:
p6 = p5. In contrast, an actuarially fair increase in pension (p6 > p5) will be
analyzed as a policy experiment.
The government collects flat rate income taxes {τp, τ b} to balance the pen-
sions and the unemployment benefits respectively. When the agent is employed,
he pays both taxes, whereas unemployed workers are only taxed to finance the
SS system.
3.1.7 Bellman equations
Let V ei (w) be the value of the optimization problem for a worker of age Ci and
paid w, V ui the value of the optimization problem for an unemployed worker of
age Ci, and V
r the value of a retiree. Let Vi(w) be the value of the optimization
problem for a worker of age i who was employed in the previous period and has
today the option to work at wage w
Vi(w) = max {V
e
i (w), V
u
i } for i = 1, .., 5
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Bellman equations can be written as:
for i = 1, 2, 3
V ei (w) = u((1− τp − τ b)w,T − h) + β {pii[(1− λi)Vi(w) + λiV
u
i ]
+(1− pii)[(1− λi+1)Vi+1(w) + λi+1V
u
i+1]
}
(8)
V ui = max
si
{u((1− τp)bi, T − si)
+β
{
pii
[
φ(si)
∫
Vi(w)dFi(w) + (1− φ(si))V
u
i
]
+(1− pii)
[
φ(si+1)
∫
Vi+1(w)dFi+1(w) + (1− φ(si+1))V
u
i+1
]}}
(9)
for i = 4
V e4 (w) = u((1− τp − τ b)w, T − h) + β {pi4[(1− λ4)V4(w) + λ4V
u
4 ]
+(1− pi4)[(1− λ5)max{V5(w), V
r
5 }+ λ5max{V
u
5 , V
r
5 }]} (10)
V u4 = max
s4
{u((1− τp)b4, T − s4)
+β
{
pi4
[
φ(s4)
∫
V4(w)dF4(w) + (1− φ(s4))V
u
4
]
+(1− pi4)
[
φ(s5)
∫
max{V5(w), V r5 }dF5(w)
+(1− φ(s5))max{V u5 , V
r
5 }
]}}
(11)
At age 4, workers expect with a probability (1− pi4) to have the right to retire:
age 5 constitutes the eligibility age for retirement. Given the age at first job,
age 5 is also the age of full pension. These equations highlight an important
feature of the French Social Security system: the pension is not lowered by an
unemployment spell. The value V r5 of becoming retired in C5 is the same for
employed or non-employed workers. If all workers, whatever their employment
status, choose to retire in C5, employed and unemployed people in C4 have the
same expected value V r5 in the near future (see equations (10) and (11)). This
explains why the job value is weak when the retirement age is imminent.
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for i = 5
V e5 (w) = u((1− τp − τ b)w,T − h)
+β {pi5[(1− λ5)max{V5(w), V
r
5 }+ λ5max{V
u
5 , V
r
5 }]
+(1− pi5)V
r6
6
}
(12)
V u5 = max
s5
{u((1− τp)b5, T − s5)
+β
{
pi5
[
φ(s5)
∫
max{V5(w), V
r
5 }dF5(w) (13)
+(1− φ(s5))max{V
u
5 , V
r
5 }] + (1− pi5)V
r6
6
}}
V r5 = u(p5, T ) + β
{
pi5V
r
5 + (1− pi5)V
r5
6
}
(14)
Two retiree value functions must be distinguished in C6, namely the already (in
C5) retired workers’ value V
r5
6 and the newly (in C6) retired workers’ value V
r6
6 .
for i = 6
V r56 = u(p5, T ) + β
{
pi6V
r5
6
}
(15)
V r66 = u(p6, T ) + β
{
pi6V
r6
6
}
(16)
In the benchmark case, we assume that the pension is not increased by additional
years of working beyond the full pension rate: p6 = p5. This implies that the
employment value does not increase if the agent decides to postpone retirement,
leading to implicitly imposing a huge tax on continued activity. In contrast,
an actuarially fair increase in pension (p6 > p5) can make the early retirement
option undesirable for employed workers. In this case, employment is more
valuable than any other options: there is now an employment surplus at the
early retirement age, which conversely boosts the search intensity before this
age.
The optimal decisions for search intensity are given by:
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for i = 1, 2, 3, 4
u′2((1− τp)bi, T − si) = φ
′(si)βpii
([∫
Vi(w)dFi(w)
]
− V ui
)
(17)
for i = 5
u′2((1− τp)b5, T − s5) = φ
′(s5)βpi5
( [∫
max[V5(w), V
r
5 ]dF5(w)
]
−max[V u5 , V
r
5 ]
)
(18)
The marginal disutility of job search activity equals its expected return, which
is captured by the increase in the probability of getting a wage offer times the
expected surplus of employment. In the case of early retirement at 60, the right
hand side of equation (17), given equations (10) and (11), states that, as the
individual ages, the gap between discounted earnings (Vi) and unemployment
benefits (V ui ) narrows. Employed and unemployed people in C4 expect to be
in the same state in the near future. Decreasing the unemployment benefit is
then a traditional solution to foster job search by creating an instantaneous gap
between employment and non-employment value. In contrast, if the continued
activity opportunity is sufficiently attractive after the early retirement age, the
employment and the unemployment values converge later, only when the man-
datory retirement (C6) is imminent. The horizon of older workers just before
the early retirement age is then broadened. By inspecting equations (5) to (8),
it appears that this result can be reached by increasing the relative value of p6
to p5. This incentive policy is implemented in Section 3.5.
3.1.8 Equilibrium
The steady state equilibrium is characterized, for i = 1, ...6, by workers’ oc-
cupational choices {Ai, I
e
i , I
u
i }, reservation wages wi and search intensity si,
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value functions V ei , V
u
i and V
r
i , a set of stationary labor market aggregates
{Ui,Ni, Ri, Pi,Gi(w)} and a tax policy {τ b, τp}. The stationary equilibrium is
such that:
• Individual policy rules {si, wi, Ai, I
e
i , I
u
i } are solution to the lifetime max-
imization programs (8)-(16).
• Ui, Ri and Gi(w) are the stationary solution of equations (1)-(7) and Pi is
the stationary distribution associated with the matrix Π. Ni then solves :
Pi = Ni + Ui +Ri, ∀i.
• The tax rates τ b and τp adjust to balance the budgets of unemployment
insurance and social security respectively, given the exogenous levels of the
unemployment benefits bi and of the pensions p5 and p6:
τ b
5∑
i=1
Ni
∫
wi
wdGi(w) =
5∑
i=1
Uibi
τp
5∑
i=1
Ni
∫
wi
wdGi(w) + τ p
5∑
i=1
Uibi = R
6
6p6 +
6∑
i=5
R5i p5
3.2 Specification and calibration of the model
Before investigating the interplay between the endogenous distance to retirement
and individual job search decisions on the labor market, it is necessary to specify
the utility function and calibrate parameters of the job search model. At this
stage, we have two options: either to consider a theoretical setting that we could
solve analytically at the expense of the robustness of our results or to calibrate a
more general specification of the utility function and the wage distribution. We
chose to follow the second route in order to quantify the economic mechanisms in
a more general setting, even though we do not claim to encompass all dimensions
of employment and retirement decisions.
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3.2.1 Specification of the preferences
Let us consider the following utility function18:
u(c, T − z) =
(cν(T − z)1−ν)1−σ
1− σ
The function that maps the job search intensity onto the probabilities of obtain-
ing a wage offer is defined as follows:
φ(s) = γs where s ∈ [0; 1]
In the literature (Mortensen, 2003; Postel-Vinay & Robin, 2004), the search
effort is a concave function of employment surplus. This simple linear rate of
the offer arrival function combined with our utility function ensures that this
standard property holds.
Given these assumptions, the optimal search intensity is given by: for i =
1, ..., 5
si = T −
{
γβS
(1− ν)((1− τp)bi)ν(1−σ)
} 1
(1−ν)(1−σ)−1
(19)
where: S =
{
pii
[∫
Vi(w)dFi(w)− V ui
]
if i = 1, ..., 4
pii
[∫
max[Vi(w), V r5 ]dF5(w)−max[V
u
i , V
r
5 ]
]
if i = 5
Equation (19) shows that higher unemployment benefits increase the elasticity
of the job search effort to a variation in S, leading to a greater distance to
retirement effect19. Moreover, as this elasticity is decreasing with the value of S
(s is a concave function of S), higher separation rates and unemployment benefits
by decreasing the job value S raise the importance of the distance effect.
18This function is compatible with a balanced growth path.
19With this utility function, given the calibration of σ, a high non-employment income implies
a decrease in the marginal utility of leisure.
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3.2.2 Calibration based on external information
We base our calibration on the French Labor Force Surveys prior to the 1993
Balladur Reform (4 waves from 1990 to 1993). Indeed, given the simplicity of
our model, we cannot pretend to be able to generate heterogeneous retirement
ages. When computing the key elements to calibrate our model (unemployment
duration, employment rates, separation rate, etc.) on the French micro data,
we restrict our sample to low and middle wage workers. Indeed, these workers
enter the job market at very young ages. Therefore, before the 1993 reform, they
have accumulated the required number of contributive years before 60 years old
which allows them to retire at 60. This fact encourages us to calibrate the model
on pre-1993 data and on low and middle wage workers who constitute 85% of
the labor force, because our stylized model can only capture this homogeneous
retirement behavior20.
We first discretize the working life cycle by choosing quite homogenous age
groups. We have already provided some empirical or institutional arguments in
favor of the discretization in the presentation of the model. In France, 60 is
the eligibility age for retirement and 65 the maximum age. Between 60 and 65,
agents have the choice of withdrawing their pension or not. It is then particularly
important to distinguish the 60-65 and the 65+ groups. The expected age of
death is set at 80. The working life cycle before the eligibility age for SS pension
is split into four age groups. The first one, from 20 to 30, aims at taking into
account the labor market entry process. We consider that all workers are first
unemployed at 20. The employment rate is then growing with age as long as
20 In contrast, in our empirical investigation based on micro data, we needed heterogeneous
distances to retirement to robustly identify our feedback effect. We thus chose to use Labor
Force Surveys also after 1993.
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this entry process carries on. On French data, the employment rate becomes
stable from the age of 30 onward. Until 50, the employment rate exhibits a great
stability. From the age of 50 onward, the employment rate starts declining.
It would have been useful to discretize all ages between 50 and 60. However,
in order to keep the model within tractable bounds, we consider only two age
groups, 50-54 and 55-59. The dividing age of 55 is natural as special income
programs exist from this age to the eligibility age for retirement. In the pre
and post 1993 periods, eligibility for old age specific programs is 55 years old
for workers who have already contributed the required number of years to Social
Security, which is the case for low skilled individuals. In contrast, eligibility
for specific older worker schemes is unconditional for workers older than 57. In
addition, the choice of age 55 is supported by our estimates : in Table 2, the
distance effect matters at a 10% level from 55 through 59.
To sum up, the four age groups prior to the retirement periods are such that
each individual has an expected duration of 10 years in the first class C1, 20
years in C2, 5 years in C3 and 5 years in C4: this leads to an expected duration
of 40 years in the labor market. We assume that the expected duration is 5 years
for C5 and 15 years for C6.
It remains to calibrate the other parameters of the model. Traditionally,
the parameter calibration relies either on external information or on empirical
targets that must be reached by the model. Our calibration strategy is to use
as much external information as possible in order to use the employment rates
by age as overidentifying restrictions. Most parameter values are indeed based
on external information. This is the case for the discount factor, the relative
preference for leisure, the risk aversion, the wage distribution and the separation
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rate by age. On the other hand, the search efficiency, the unemployment benefits
and the pension are set in order to make the model’s predictions consistent with
French data.
As we have set the model period to a month, the discount factor β equals
0.9967, which yields an annual interest rate of 4%. The parameters needed for the
calibration of the utility function have been extensively studied in the literature
(Prescott, 1986; Cooley & Prescott, 1995; Hansen & Imrohoroglu, 1992; Rios
Rull, 1992; Huggett & Ventura, 1999). ν is set to the traditional value of 0.33, σ
to 2. This implies that the value of the relative risk aversion σ˜ = 1− ν(1− σ) is
equal to 1.33. This is close to the estimates provided by Attanasio et al. (1999).
We assume that the exogenous wage offer distribution Fi(w) is a log-normal
distribution. In order to replicate the wage increase with age, the wage offer
distribution is assumed to depend on the worker’s age. We then potentially
take care of some general human capital accumulation in our setup. From the
French LFS, we compute the mean and the standard deviation of the wage offer
distribution over each age group. We only consider wages corresponding to job
tenures of less than one year. In Table 4, we indeed observe a shift to the
right of the wage offer distribution along the life cycle. As we have only a few
observations after 60, we consider the same distribution as between 55 and 59.
Using the French LFS data set, we calibrate the job separation rate by age
groups in order to capture the decrease in the labor demand for older workers.
For middle-aged workers (C2 age group), λ2 is set to 0.0055. The separation rate
at age 55-59 is two times higher than the one relative to the middle-aged workers,
whereas the 50-54 year old workers display roughly the same value. Note that
the separation rate is equal to 0.018 for the younger workers.
36
3.2.3 Calibration based on targets
The unemployment benefits b for middle-aged workers are calibrated in order
to match the observed average replacement rate of 37%, which is consistent
with Blanchard and Wolfers’(2000) estimates. As a consequence, our results
on employment rates by age will be consistent with a realistic calibration of
unemployment benefits21.
Given the legislation in the early nineties in France (Daniel, 1999), workers
aged more than 50 years benefit from more generous unemployment compensa-
tions, especially non-employed workers aged 55-59 who are in specific programs
characterized by a lower decrease in their benefits with the unemployment spell.
Consistently with this legislation, we add a premium of 11.5% (6%) on the un-
employment benefit for workers older than 55 (between 50 and 55), relative to
the previous age group C3 (C2).
We now turn to the pension system calibration. We calibrate the pension level
in order to match the observed replacement rate which equals 85% (Hairault et
al., 2008) of the last wage for workers in our sample. Moreover, in our benchmark
calibration, we consider an actuarially-unfair Social Security scheme as was the
case until the 2003 reform in France22. We assume the pensions to be the same
21Our model is not able to capture the specific problems of entry of young people on the labor
market (high turnover, learning, etc.). As a result, we calibrate the unemployment benefits b1 so
as to reproduce the employment rate of workers aged 20-30. This generates a consistent initial
condition to avoid distorting the employment rate of subsequent age groups. Our paper focuses
on the distance effect that does not by definition affect this age group. A better understanding
of the job entry is left for future research.
22The 2003 reform introduced an actuarial flavor in the French pension scheme by giving a 3%
increase in pension for any additional working year beyond the required number of contributive
years.
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whatever the retirement age between 60 and 65: p6 = p5. No pension adjustment
is taken into account in the case of delayed retirement.
As the parameter γ has no empirical counterpart, we choose to calibrate it in
order to replicate the observed average unemployment duration for workers aged
30-55. Based on the French LFS, the average unemployment duration amounts
to 15 months, which leads to γ = 0.80. The calibration is summarized in Table
4.
3.2.4 Model assessment
As much external information as possible have been used in order to assess the
ability of our model to replicate the employment rates by age. As can be seen in
Table 5, we match quite well the decrease in the employment rate as the retire-
ment age stands out. Especially, the dramatic decrease in the employment rate
for workers aged 55 to 59 is quite well reproduced. This age group mainly differs
by more generous unemployment benefits, a higher separation rate and a lower
distance to the retirement age. It is enough to strongly decrease their employ-
ment rate in a way which is consistent with the data. It must be acknowledged
that the levels are not perfectly reproduced, in particular the one specific to the
50-54 age group. Yet, we consider that this simple model works surprisingly well
to capture the decline in the employment rates at the end of the working life
cycle.
We also replicate the fact that French workers retire when they reach the full
record of contributive years, as documented by Blanchet & Pelé (1997) 23. Given
the lack of heterogeneity in terms of careers, assumed for the sake of simplicity,
it implies that all individuals must be retired at age 60 in our model. Given the
2397.6% of men retire at the full pension age.
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Table 4: Calibrated values
Parameter Reference
Discount factor β 0.9967 Annual interest rate of 4%
Consumption share in utility function ν 0.33 Prescott(1986), Cooley & Prescott(1995),
Hansen & Imrohoroglu (1992)
Rios Rull (1996), Huggett & Ventura (1999)
Relative risk aversion σ˜ 1.33 Attanasio et al. (1999)
Workers aged 20-29
Mean wage, French Francs 6817 French LFS
Wage standard deviation 0.1723 French LFS
Job separation rate λ1 0.018 French LFS
Workers aged 30-49
Mean wage, French Francs 7538 French LFS
Wage standard deviation 0.2095 French LFS
Job separation rate λ2 0.0055 French LFS
Workers aged 50-54
Mean wage, French Francs 7600 French LFS
Wage standard deviation 0.2046 French LFS
Job separation rate λ3 0.0055 French LFS
Workers aged 55-59
Mean wage, French Francs 8081 French LFS
Wage standard deviation 0.2596 French LFS
Job separation rate λ4 0.011 French LFS
Workers aged 60-64
Mean wage, French Francs 8081 French LFS
Wage standard deviation 0.2596 French LFS
Job separation rate λ5 0.011 French LFS
Parameter Target
unemployment benefit b1 for workers aged 20-29 2387 Employment rate of workers aged 20-29: 0.83
unemployment benefit b2 for workers aged 30-49 3098 Average replacement rate of unemployment benefits: 0.37
unemployment benefit b3 for workers aged 50-54 3294 Unemployment benefit premium: 1.06
unemployment benefit b4 for workers aged 55-59 3703 Unemployment benefit premium: 1.115
pension level p5 8000 Average replacement rate: 0.85
search effectiveness γ 0.80 Average unemployment duration: 15
Table 5: Employment rates
Age groups C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
Age in years 20-29 30-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
1. Data 0.830 0.883 0.847 0.559 0.024
2. Benchmark model 0.827 0.867 0.874 0.549 0
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calibrated preferences, the model is able to generate a 100% rate of retirement
at 60. It turns out that no workers choose to delay retirement in the case of no
actuarial adjustments (column C5, Line 2 in Table 5).
Given the levels of non-employment incomes and pensions, the equilibrium
tax rates are τ b = 6.99% and τp = 31.41%. Notice that these values are close
to their empirical counterparts, respectively 6.4% and 26% in France despite the
highly stylized model we are considering.
3.3 Investigating the feedback effect of retirement age on the
job search
This section aims at investigating the interplay between the endogenous distance
to retirement and individual job search decisions on the labor market.
In Table 5, the fall in the employment rate of workers aged 55-59 results
from the combination of two different types of effect: the expected effect of the
upward sloping profile of unemployment benefits and separation rates on the one
hand and the distance effect on the other hand, that is specific to the life cycle
framework. This section aims at illustrating the respective role of each element.
Younger workers are by definition not affected by the distance effect. Fur-
thermore, in the benchmark calibration, workers aged 60 and beyond are retirees.
So, in this section, we will focus on the behavior of age groups 2 to 4, people
whose age is between 30 and 59.
3.3.1 A distance effect
How is the job search behavior altered when individuals get closer to their retire-
ment age? In order to make the distance mechanism at work more transparent,
we first examine the job search behaviors across ages when all non-employed
incomes and separation rates are set at the same values, those specific to older
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workers. Figure 2 illustrates the two main forces at work in the model at the
end of working life.
• First, older workers will accept lower wages because impatience increases
with age: the shorter the distance to retirement, the smaller the benefit
of waiting to see if a higher job offer becomes available, as the benefits of
employment cannot be enjoyed for a long period. As a result, accepting a
job becomes more attractive: a larger number of job offers becomes accept-
able. This is directly measured by the increasing probability of accepting
a job offer, [1 − F (wR)], where wR denotes the reservation wage by age.
Therefore, this first effect cannot account for the low employment rate of
older workers in countries such as France.
• The second effect makes the model more consistent with French data. Even
if older unemployed workers accept lower wage offers, their incentives to
search for job offers decline. After age 55, their job search intensity falls and
so does the probability of getting a job offer, measured by φ(s). Equations
(11), (13) and (19) show that, as the individual ages, the gap between
the values of an employed and a non-employed worker narrows whatever
the reservation wage. The non-employed worker and the employed worker
expect to become retirees and to receive the same pension: the value of
employment converges to the one of non-employment. These effects explain
the decrease in the employment surplus S. As the non-employment income
and the separation rate are constant (bi = b4, λi = λ4 ∀i), the job search
intensity si decreases with age only because of the fall in S due to the
distance to retirement effect (equation (19)).
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Figure 2: Search behavior over the life-cycle (b and λ flat over the life cycle)
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Two economic forces move in opposite directions at the end of the working
life. The decrease in the reservation wage leads to an increase in employment
at the end of the life-cycle, while the decline in job search intensity, captur-
ing the distance effect, implies that the transition rate from unemployment-to-
employment, φ(s)[1−F (wR)], goes down at the end of the life-cycle. Our numer-
ical example measures the combination of these two effects and shows that the
distance effect gets the upper hand (φ(s)[1−F (wR)] declines) for the benchmark
calibration.
However, it could be misleading to conclude that the distance to retirement
alone explains this result. Equation (19) implies that the (high) level of the
unemployment benefits and of the separation rate may influence the effect of
the distance to retirement on the job search intensity. The impatience effect can
also be influenced by the level of the unemployment benefit. Figure 3 shows
the job finding rate of the different age groups relative to the middle age group
(C2) when b and λ are still constant over the life cycle but fixed at the level of
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middle-aged workers. The decrease in the transition rate from unemployment
to employment over the life cycle is now much lower, particularly when the
unemployment benefit is low; the impatience effect even dominates when both
the unemployment benefit and the separation rate are fixed at a lower level. This
suggests that the distance effect alters the employment rates of older workers only
in conjunction with generous unemployment benefits and high separation rates.
The levels of the unemployment benefit and of the separation rate determine the
magnitude of the distance to retirement effect.
This result sheds light on the empirical results we obtained in Section 2.
In the context of high unemployment benefits, the distance effect may be very
significant. The number of years prior to retirement is crucial, since workers close
to retirement age modify their job search behavior. However, this occurs only
when unemployment benefits are high enough: the generosity of these programs
amplifies the retirement age effect by giving unemployed people the means to
wait for retirement without searching for a job. Furthermore, the distance effect
modifies older workers’ search especially when the separation rate is high. This
generalizes our conclusion that the distance effect matters but in conjunction
with other factors, especially higher unemployment benefits and separation rates.
There is in that sense no pure distance effect in our model.
3.3.2 Adding upward sloping unemployment benefits
In addition to the distance effect, the age-increasing profile of the unemployment
benefits contributes to the age-decreasing profile of the employment rate. First,
the job search intensity is now much higher for younger workers (Figures 2 and
4). Secondly, the probability of accepting a wage offer is less age-increasing,
and even lower at 55 than at 50. The upward sloping unemployment benefits
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Figure 3: A conditional distance effect
2 3 4
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
age
R
el
at
iv
e 
job
 fin
din
g r
ate
 
 
b and λ high
b low and λ high
b high and λ low
b and λ low
partially offsets the impatience effect.
3.3.3 Adding upward sloping separation rates
Finally, the age-increasing separation rate profile during the working life is taken
into account. All the mechanisms of the benchmark calibration are now at work:
younger workers have lower separation rates than older workers. As a lower
separation rate increases the expected job duration, the upward sloping profile
of the separation rate contributes to amplify the decline in the job search intensity
at the end of the working life (Figures 2 and 5). However, it implies that older
workers are less choosy in their job acceptance, leading to a reinforcement of the
impatience effect.
3.4 A quantitative evaluation
Line 2 in Table 5 (shown also in Table 6) shows that the combination of the
distance effect and the rise in the non-employment income and in the separation
rate at the end of the working life leads to a dramatic 30% fall in the employment
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Figure 4: Search behavior over the life-cycle when b increases with age
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Figure 5: Search behavior over the life-cycle when λ increases with age.
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Table 6: Employment rates
Age groups C2 C3 C4
Age in years 30-49 50-54 55-59
1 . Data 0.883 0.847 0.559
2. Benchmark model 0.867 0.874 0.549
3. Model with b high and λ high 0.739 0.637 0.461
4. Model with b low and λ low 0.871 0.898 0.903
5. Model with b high and λ low 0.811 0.802 0.752
6. Model with b low and λ high 0.833 0.854 0.847
Note:
b high: all age groups receive older workers’ unemployment benefits
b low: all age groups receive young workers’ unemployment benefits
λ high: all age groups are characterized by older workers’ separation rate
λ low: all age groups are characterized by young workers’ separation rate
rate. Figures 2 - 5 display the mechanisms behind this result. At this stage, one
could argue that the decline in older workers’ employment results more from
the upward sloping unemployment benefits and separation rates than from the
distance effect. In order to measure the role of the distance effect, Table 6
displays the employment rates predicted by the model for different values of
unemployment benefits and separation rates. In all cases, these latter values are
constant by age in order to identify the contribution of the distance effect.
Line 3 in Table 6 displays the results obtained for high unemployment benefits
and separation rates (set at the level specific to the 55-59 year old individuals).
First, at ages when the distance effect does not affect search behavior (before the
age of 50), the employment rate is about 10% lower on Line 3 than on Line 2.
This decrease can be interpreted as the pure effect of both the greater generosity
of the unemployment benefits and the lower job duration. As the decline in the
employment rate accelerates when retirement is imminent, the distance effect
does quantitatively matter24. This suggests that the unemployment benefits
24This importance of the distance effect is robust to different values of key parameters.
However, it can be shown that the lower the search efficiency γ, the lower the employment rate
of older workers. Low values of γ could explain why older workers do not search intensively
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and the separation rate alone account only for a third of the decline in the older
workers’ employment rate. If the workers aged 55-59 were at the same distance
to retirement as the workers aged 30-49, their employment rate would be much
higher. In that sense, the proximity to retirement explains the main component
of the observed decline of their employment rate.
However, this does not imply that the distance to retirement alone (inde-
pendently of the values of the unemployment benefits and of the separation
rates) matters so much. As already emphasized in Figure 3, Line 4, Table 6
shows that the employment rates before retirement remain quite stable when
considering low unemployment benefits and separation rates. Individuals at all
ages are now encouraged to work, as the impatience effect dominates the de-
crease in the search intensity at the end of the working life. Lines 5 and 6 allow
us to differentiate the impact of the unemployment benefits and the separation
rates. The interaction of the distance effect with the generosity of unemployment
benefits appears stronger.
The distance effect accounts for a decline of two-thirds in the employment rate
at the end of working life only in conjunction with high unemployment benefits
and depressed labor demand for older workers. Ljungqvist & Sargent (2008)
obtain similar interactions in another context. Turbulent times, which create
high skill depreciation during unemployment spells, discourage the job search if
when the distance to retirement is short, thereby boosting the quantitative importance of the
distance effect. In addition, the higher the risk aversion σ, the larger the distance effect. Indeed,
for a non employed worker, the risky choice is the decision to keep looking for a job while the
non search behavior yields a steady income. For workers who are close to retirement, the choice
to remain on the labor market appears all the more risky as the gain from employment cannot
be enjoyed for very long.
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the unemployment benefits are indexed on last earnings. For the older workers,
this effect is magnified because they have less time (a shorter horizon) for any
accumulation of new skills if they find a job25. We show that the existence of
generous assistance programs for older workers in Europe along with a depressed
labor demand is enough to lead to strong interactions with the proximity to
retirement which can explain the observed low employment rate.
3.5 The Double Dividend of Actuarially-Fair Pension Adjust-
ments
Two options to deal with the lower employment rate at the end of the working
life can be considered. On the one hand, decreasing the generosity of unemploy-
ment benefits would be efficient, in particular, and unexpectedly, by dampening
the distance effect. On the other hand, delaying the retirement age could be
another strategy if a high unemployment benefit for older workers is maintained:
this argument reinforces the case for more actuarially-fair adjustments in Social
Security provisions. We evaluate this policy in this Section.
Over the last decade, several pension reforms have been implemented in
OECD countries to increase the labor-market participation of older people. Along
the lines of the US Social Security system, the actuarially fair adjustment was
introduced in the 1990s in Italy and Sweden which have adopted a so-called “no-
tional defined contribution” model, thereby providing flexible retirement choices.
Public pensions have been made more neutral vis-à-vis work-retirement de-
cisions. Pension entitlements depend, among other things, on the number of
years worked, the size of lifetime earnings and remaining life expectancy at the
age of withdrawal.
25We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this analogy with Ljungqvist & Sargent’s
(2008) results.
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In this section, we show that, beyond the incentive to delay retirement, the
decrease in the tax on continued work has sufficiently large effects to encourage
unemployed older workers to find a job. This is an additional point in favor of this
policy, usually left aside by neglecting the impact of Social Security arrangements
on job search behavior in an economy with full employment.
In the previous sections, pension schemes were characterized by an extreme
tax on continued activity: the pension was constant whether individuals retired
at 60 or 65 years old. In this section, the tax on continued work is lowered by
increasing the pension for workers who choose to retire at age 65 rather than 60:
an actuarially-fair policy amounts to a 46% increase in pension in the case of
delayed retirement by 5 years. Let us recall that it remunerates five additional
working years, and not only one. This value is consistent with Hairault et. al.’s
(2008) computations on French data as well as the US 1983 old age pension
reform. As we want to analyze pension reforms only, unemployment benefits are
left unchanged.26
Actuarially-fair pension schemes should greatly increase the value of being
employed, first relative to the value of being retired, but also relative to the value
of being unemployed. For unemployed workers aged 55 or more, the incentives
to look for a job go up, as the horizon during which the unemployment status
is dominated by employment is extended. Is this return on the job search large
enough to reduce the effect of generous unemployment benefits and higher separ-
ation rates before the early retirement age? In the light of Figure 6, the answer
26This section aims at illustrating how the distance effect could magnify the impact of a
common Social Security reform implemented in some European countries. It is beyond the
scope of the paper to assess the optimality of such a policy compared with alternative measures
such as decreasing unemployment benefits.
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to this question is a qualified yes.
• First, with incentive schemes, the implicit tax on continued activity is
removed. Thus, more individuals remain at work until the maximum re-
tirement age. 20.1% of workers choose to delay retirement until the age of
65 (Line 2, column C5 in Table 7). All workers unemployed from 60 on
choose to retire.
• The first effect is the standard expected gain from the introduction of
actuarially-fair schemes. The job search model actually helps uncover an
additional gain from this policy: incentive schemes not only encourage
individuals to keep their jobs after the early retirement age, but also make
job offers more attractive to unemployed people before this age because
the distance to retirement increases. In age group C4, a more intensive
job search effort, relative to the benchmark case, reduces the fall in the
transition rate to employment (Figure 6). The employment rate of age
group C4 goes up from 55% to 71% (Lines 1 and 2 in Table 7), despite the
high non-employment benefits and separation rates.
Incentives to work longer generate a double dividend: the increase in pension
because of continued activity not only encourages some employed workers to
delay retirement but also gives incentives to non-employed workers below the
age at which they are eligible to retire to search more intensively. Incentive
schemes globally increase older workers’ employment rate.
Table 7: Incentive schemes and employment rates
Age groups C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
Age in years 20-29 30-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
1. Benchmark 0.828 0.867 0.874 0.549 0
2. Retirement Policy 0.830 0.867 0.874 0.714 0.201
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Figure 6: Job search behavior over the life-cycle with incentive schemes
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4 Conclusion
This paper aims at quantifying the effect of the retirement age decision on the job
search prior to retirement. Based on French micro data, the time horizon before
retirement seems to account for the low employment rate of older workers. We
extend McCall’s (1970) search model to allow for life cycle features and endogen-
ous retirement. Calibration on the French economy confirms the major effects
uncovered by the micro-econometric analysis. This gives theoretical grounds
for the mechanisms at work on the labor market when the retirement age gets
closer, in particular the strong interactions between the distance effect and gen-
erous unemployment benefits at the end of the working life. We also show that
the distance effect modifies pre-retired workers’ search when the separation rate
is high. Time to retirement matters but in conjunction with other factors such as
higher unemployment benefits and depressed labor demand. Finally, the model
predicts that a decrease in the tax on continued activity not only makes more
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older workers delay retirement, but also encourages more unemployed people to
find a job, yielding a double dividend from incentive schemes. It provides strong
support in favor of policies that reward continued activity on an actuarially-fair
basis.
Overall, we think that integrating the retirement deadline into labor market
analysis is a promising approach which could be undertaken to revisit other
important issues such as training, labor demand and wage bargaining. This is
left for future research.
APPENDIX
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Table A.1: Age and expected retirement age
Age 11 years and more Between 6 and 10 years 3 to 5 years Less than 2 years Total
50 1118 6934 0 0 8052
51 785 6970 0 0 7755
52 597 6920 0 0 7517
53 352 6993 0 0 7345
54 209 6860 0 0 7069
55 0 711 6038 0 6749
56 0 479 6188 0 6667
57 0 340 6283 0 6623
58 0 167 313 6091 6571
59 0 89 248 6369 6706
Total 3061 36463 19070 12460 71054
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics - Men (1)
Not employed Employed Total
Total 60893 319641 380534
16.00 84.00 100.00
Number of years before retirement
11 years and more 39257 273284 312541
12.56 87.44 100.00
Between 6 ans 10 years 6665 29798 36463
18.28 81.72 100.00
3 to 5 years 7068 12002 19070
37.06 62.94 100.00
Less than 2 years 7903 4557 12460
63.43 36.57 100.00
Marital Status
Live with spouse 36199 238726 274925
13.17 86.83 100.00
Live alone 24694 80915 105609
23.38 76.62 100.00
Number of children
No child 27138 98646 125784
21.58 78.42 100.00
1 or 2 children 25145 172691 197836
12.71 87.29 100.00
3 to 5 children 7846 46709 54555
14.38 85.62 100.00
6 children and more 764 1595 2359
32.39 67.61 100.00
Size of city
Parisian Area 13650 60668 74318
18.37 81.63 100.00
more than 200000 inhab Outside Parisian Area 13956 64212 78168
17.85 82.15 100.00
20000 to 200000 inhab 10502 56432 66934
15.69 84.31 100.00
less than 20000 inhab 14976 90600 105576
14.19 85.81 100.00
Rural town 60893 319641 380534
16.00 84.00 100.00
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics - Men (2)
Not employed Employed Total
Sector
Industry 18661 109554 128215
14.55 85.45 100.00
Agriculture 1981 7229 9210
21.51 78.49 100.00
Construction 9842 36815 46657
21.09 78.91 100.00
Services 30409 166043 196452
15.48 84.52 100.00
Occupational Groups
Blue Collars 36706 167477 204183
17.98 82.02 100.00
Clerk 8985 33573 42558
21.11 78.89 100.00
Middle skilled worker 10372 73529 83901
12.36 87.64 100.00
Executive 4830 45062 49892
9.68 90.32 100.00
Citizenship
French 56017 303165 359182
15.60 84.40 100.00
Non French 4876 16476 21352
22.84 77.16 100.00
Education
Low education 50143 229843 279986
17.91 82.09 100.00
High education 10750 89798 100548
10.69 89.31 100.00
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Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics - Men (3)
Not employed Employed Total Not employed Employed Total
Age dummies Time Dummy
Less than 50 years old 38894 270586 309480 1990 3789 23288 27077
12.57 87.43 100.00 13.99 86.01 100.00
50 113 6922 8052 1991 3744 23564 27308
14.03 85.97 100.00 13.71 86.29 100.00
51 1221 6534 7755 1992 4159 23848 28007
15.74 84.26 100.00 14.85 85.15 100.00
52 1334 6183 7517 1993 4817 24610 29427
17.75 82.25 100.00 16.37 83.63 100.00
53 1431 5914 7345 1994 5428 24613 30041
19.48 80.52 100.00 18.07 81.93 100.00
54 1522 5547 7069 1995 5098 25125 30223
21.53 78.47 100.00 16.87 83.13 100.00
55 1709 5040 6749 1996 5188 25406 30594
25.32 74.68 100.00 16.96 83.04 100.00
56 2392 4275 6667 1997 5241 24858 30099
35.88 64.12 100.00 17.41 82.59 100.00
57 3035 3588 6623 1998 5076 25029 30105
45.83 54.17 100.00 16.86 83.14 100.00
58 3706 2865 6571 1999 5275 25253 30528
56.40 43.60 100.00 17.28 82.72 100.00
59 4519 2187 6706 2000 3837 21811 25648
67.39 32.61 100.00 14.96 85.04 100.00
2001 4512 26283 30795
14.65 85.35 100.00
2002 4729 25953 30682
15.41 84.59 100.00
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Table A.5: Strategy I : Logit on male employment probability - Estimates on
other control variables (1)
without distance with distance
Coefficient P value Coefficient P value
Age variables
Age 0.0568 0.000 0.057 0.000
Age * Age -0.0008 0.000 -0.001 0.000
Age = 50 -0.1012 0.0020 0.090 0.738
Age = 51 -0.2177 0.0000 0.047 0.849
Age = 52 -0.3250 0.0000 -0.494 0.028
Age = 53 -0.4245 0.0000 -0.358 0.091
Age = 54 -0.5554 0.0000 -0.611 0.001
Age = 55 -0.7883 0.0000 -0.972 0.000
Age = 56 -1.2869 0.0000 -1.632 0.000
Age = 57 -1.6938 0.0000 -2.097 0.000
Age = 58 -2.1476 0.0000 -2.557 0.000
Age = 59 -2.6207 0.0000 -2.853 0.000
Education (Reference : Low education)
High education 0.2958 0.000 0.283 0.000
Marital status (Reference : live with a spouse)
Lives alone -0.8404 0.000 -0.841 0.000
Number of children (Reference : no children)
1-2 children 0.1583 0.000 0.158 0.000
3-5 children 0.0249 0.163 0.023 0.199
+6 children -0.4268 0.000 -0.428 0.000
Size of city (Reference : Parisian Area)
+200000 inhab -0.2791 0.000 -0.279 0.000
20000 to 200000 inhab -0.1961 0.000 -0.196 0.000
- 20000 inhab 0.0105 0.628 0.010 0.659
Rural area 0.1365 0.000 0.137 0.000
Occupational group (Reference : Blue collar)
Clerks -0.1930 0.0000 -0.192 0.000
Middle White Collars 0.2650 0.0000 0.267 0.000
Executives 0.4340 0.0000 0.422 0.000
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Table A.6: Strategy I : Logit on male employment probability - Estimates on
other control variables (2)
Without distance With distance
Coefficient P value Coefficient P value
Sector (Reference : Industry)
Agriculture -0.3413 0.0000 -0.342 0.000
Construction -0.3595 0.0000 -0.360 0.000
Services 0.1971 0.0000 0.196 0.000
Citizenship (Reference : French)
Non french -0.4997 0.0000 -0.500 0.000
Time Dummy (Reference : 1990)
1991 -0.0140 0.4850 -0.014 0.491
1992 -0.1109 0.0000 -0.111 0.000
1993 -0.2740 0.0000 -0.274 0.000
1994 -0.4101 0.0000 -0.410 0.000
1995 -0.3199 0.0000 -0.320 0.000
1996 -0.3274 0.0000 -0.328 0.000
1997 -0.3745 0.0000 -0.375 0.000
1998 -0.3214 0.0000 -0.323 0.000
1999 -0.3343 0.0000 -0.336 0.000
2000 -0.1738 0.0000 -0.175 0.000
2001 -0.0621 0.0080 -0.065 0.005
2002 -0.1416 0.0000 -0.145 0.000
Constant 1.5157 0.0000 1.514 0.000
Number of observations 380534 380534
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Table A.7: Strategy II: Experience and Distance effect. Estimates on other
control variables (1)
Estimation (i)
Constrained population
Minimum age 60
Estimation (ii)
Constrained population
Maximum age 65
Estimation (iii)
All individuals
Coeff. P value Coeff. P value Coeff. P value
Age 0.0478 0.000 0.0861 0.314 0.0569 0.000
Age * Age -0.0007 0.000 -0.0013 0.271 -0.0008 0.000
Education (Reference : Low education)
High education 0.1710 0.000 -0.0722 0.756 0.2875 0.000
Marital status (Reference : live with a spouse)
Lives alone -0.8921 0.000 -0.5851 0.000 -0.8418 0.000
Number of children (Reference : no children)
1-2 children 0.1909 0.000 -0.0300 0.738 0.1580 0.000
3-5 children 0.0483 0.014 -0.0843 0.542 0.0235 0.187
+6 children -0.4415 0.000 -0.6867 0.311 -0.4269 0.000
Size of city (Reference : Parisian Area)
+200000 inhab -0.3465 0.000 -0.1606 0.130 -0.2794 0.000
20000 to 200000 inhab -0.2602 0.000 -0.3508 0.003 -0.1961 0.000
- 20000 inhab -0.0450 0.072 0.0495 0.757 0.0094 0.666
Rural area 0.1113 0.000 -0.1790 0.235 0.1356 0.000
Occupational group (Reference : Blue collar)
Clerks -0.2475 0.000 0.3574 0.039 -0.1919 0.000
Middle White Collars 0.2294 0.000 0.6550 0.000 0.2693 0.000
Executives 0.2834 0.000 1.3599 0.000 0.4271 0.000
Sector (Reference : Industry)
Agriculture -0.2936 0.000 -1.4415 0.004 -0.3433 0.000
Construction -0.3276 0.000 -0.4745 0.033 -0.3604 0.000
Services 0.2306 0.000 -0.1764 0.076 0.1962 0.000
Citizenship (Reference : French)
Non French -0.4009 0.000 -0.5427 0.000 -0.4995 0.000
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Table A.8: Strategy II: Experience and Distance effect. Estimates on other
control variables (2)
Estimation (i)
Constrained population
Minimum age 60
Estimation (ii)
Constrained population
Maximum age 65
Estimation (iii)
All individuals
Coeff. P value Coeff. P value Coeff. P value
Time Dummy (Reference : 1990)
1991 -0.0189 0.368 -0.0058 0.978 -0.0143 0.477
1992 -0.1026 0.000 -0.1086 0.606 -0.1109 0.000
1993 -0.2447 0.000 -0.3309 0.112 -0.2735 0.000
1994 -0.3699 0.000 -0.5293 0.009 -0.4100 0.000
1995 -0.2842 0.000 -0.6586 0.001 -0.3202 0.000
1996 -0.2971 0.000 -0.6831 0.001 -0.3274 0.000
1997 -0.3560 0.000 -0.6481 0.001 -0.3751 0.000
1998 -0.3028 0.000 -0.5844 0.004 -0.3224 0.000
1999 -0.3353 0.000 -0.5066 0.011 -0.3362 0.000
2000 -0.1881 0.000 -0.3174 0.122 -0.1754 0.000
2001 -0.0722 0.005 -0.2325 0.244 -0.0646 0.005
2002 -0.1325 0.000 -0.2660 0.184 -0.1450 0.000
Age dummies
Age = 50 1.5644 0.009 -0.2791 0.937 1.6546 0.059
Age = 51 1.3515 0.028 -1.3199 0.702 1.6517 0.058
Age = 52 0.7889 0.205 12.0185 0.046 0.0569 0.945
Age = 53 -0.2183 0.722 6.8346 0.309 -0.6905 0.382
Age = 54 -0.8286 0.183 0.4738 0.943 -1.5628 0.040
Age = 55 -1.5167 0.015 6.1640 0.347 -1.8093 0.014
Age = 56 -1.0608 0.078 7.2829 0.244 -1.9628 0.003
Age = 57 -2.6823 0.000 4.6089 0.469 -4.0024 0.000
Age = 58 -2.2889 0.000 9.7218 0.181 -3.5070 0.000
Age = 59 -3.4921 0.000 9.7390 0.161 -4.3010 0.000
Constant 1.6183 0.000 0.8632 0.589 1.5188 0.000
Number of
observations
287335 8081 380534
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